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Abstract 
It is generally agreed that the humanity, fairness and effectiveness with which a governments 
manages its criminal justice system is a key index of the state of a democracy.  But the constraints 
on realization of democratic values and aspirations in criminal justice are markedly variable. In 
the last two decades, in the wake of both increases in recorded crime and a cluster of cultural and 
economic changes, criminal justice policy in both Britain and the U.S. has become increasingly 
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 politicized: both the scale and intensity of criminalization, and the salience of criminal justice pol-
icy as an index of governments’ competence, have developed in new and, to many commenta-
tors, worrying ways. These developments have been variously characterized as the birth of a 
“culture of control” and a tendency to “govern through crime”; as a turn towards the “exclusive 
society”; and in terms of the emergence of a managerial model which focuses on the risks to se-
curity presented by particular groups. In the U.S., we witness in particular the inexorable, and 
strikingly racially patterned, rise of the prison population, amid a ratcheting up of penal severity 
which seems unstoppable in the face of popular anxiety about crime. In the context of globali-
zation, the general, and depressing, conclusion seems to be that, notwithstanding significant na-
tional differences, contemporary democracies are constrained to tread the same path of penal 
populism, albeit that their progress along it is variously advanced. A significant scaling down of 
levels of punishment and criminalization is regarded as politically impossible, the optimism of 
penal welfarism a thing, decisively, of the past. 
 
This paper sets the nature and genesis of criminal justice policy in Britain and America within a 
comparative perspective, in order to make the case for thinking that, far from being invariable or 
inevitable, the rise of penal populism does not characterize all “late modern” democracies. Rath-
er, certain features of social, political and economic organization favor or inhibit the maintenance 
of penal tolerance and humanity in punishment. I argue that, just as it is wrong to suppose that 
crime can be tackled in terms of criminal justice policy alone, it is equally erroneous to think that 
criminal justice policy is an autonomous area of governance. Rather, the possibilities and con-
straints under which governments develop and implement criminal justice policies are a function 
of not only perceived crime problems but also a cluster of institutional factors relating to political 
and economic systems. Notwithstanding a degree of convergence, so-called “globalization” has 
left many of the key differences among advanced democracies intact, and these may help to ex-
plain the striking differences in crime levels, penal severity and the capacity for penal tolerance in 
otherwise relatively similar societies. Only by understanding the institutional preconditions for a 
tolerant criminal justice system, I argue, can we think clearly about the possible options for re-
form within any one system. 
 The state of criminal justice - the scope and content of criminal law, the perform-
ance of criminal justice officials, public attitudes to crime, and the extent and intensity of 
the penal system - is often used as a broad index of how “civilized,” “progressive,” or 
indeed “truly democratic” a country is. A classic expression of this idea is that of Win-
ston Churchill, who commented nearly a century ago that: “[T]he mood and temper of 
the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing 
tests of the civilisation of any country. A calm, dispassionate recognition of the rights of 
the accused, and even of the convicted criminal, a constant heart-searching by all 
charged with the duty of punishment… these are the symbols which measure the 
stored-up strength of a nation and sign and proof of the living virtue in it” (1910). In a 
development which has been particularly marked since the emergence of a rhetorically 
powerful framework of international human rights, data about criminal justice systems 
are standardly used to draw presumptive conclusions of democratic legitimacy or illegi-
timacy. And, notwithstanding that “the mood and temper of the public” in many coun-
tries is, in relation to crime and punishment, anything but “calm and dispassionate,” 
politicians today remain foremost among those willing to exploit the power of appeals 
to democracy and human rights in criticizing criminal justice policies. As I drafted an 
earlier version of this paper, British Lord Chancellor Lord Falconer, for example, was re-
ported as describing Guantǎnamo Bay as a “shocking affront to the principles of democ-
racy,” and as arguing that “[d]emocracies can only survive where judges have the power 
to protect the rights of the individual.”1 Human rights organizations like Amnesty Inter-
national and Liberty, as well as many journalists and other commentators, have also 
drawn broad conclusions about the state of American, British or other democracies from 
the condition of their criminal justice systems.2 Key instances are recent commentaries 
on the huge expansion of the prison population in the U.S.A.3 and on the development 
of more extensive anti-terror laws in the UK.4  
 
Of course, the contested meaning of the term “democracy” makes it all too easy 
for debates about the purported democratic credentials (or lack thereof) of a criminal 
justice system to become empty polemics, with the adjective “democratic” signifying (as 
it has unfortunately come to do in some recent foreign policy rhetoric) an undifferenti-
ated term of approval rather than a conception providing normative benchmarks against 
which social practices may be assessed. This perhaps helps to explain why it has been 
politicians and pressure groups, rather than theorists of criminal justice, who have tend-
ed to frame the normative debate about criminal justice in terms of “democracy.”5 With 
                                            
1See http:// www.guardian.co.uk/Guantanamo/story/ (September 13, 2006). 
2For a recent contribution which also sets out from Churchill’s comment, see Shami Chakrabarti, 
“Reflections on the Zahid Mubarek Case,” Community Care (July 2006). As in the case of Guan-
tanamo, such critique also embraces the subsumption of matters arguably the proper object of 
criminal justice within less procedurally robust arrangements.  
3David Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford University Press, 2001); James Q. Whitman, Harsh 
Justice (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
4Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
5See for example David Held, Models of Democracy (London: Polity Press, 1987); Carole Pateman, 
Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970); Anne Phillips, Democracy 
and Difference (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) and Engendering Democracy (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1991). We should pause to note that, though it does not always appear as a qualifier to the 
  1 a few honorable exceptions,6 the burgeoning literature in normative criminal law and 
penal theory has been curiously impoverished in terms of explicit discussion of the rela-
tionship between criminal justice and democracy, rarely moving beyond relatively gen-
eral discussion of the issues most strongly indicated by a wide range of versions of liber-
alism: the desirability of guaranteeing the rule of law and principle of legality, the pre-
sumption of innocence, the accountability of criminal justice officials and policymakers, 
respect for individual rights and freedoms, the avoidance of inhumane punishments 
within a legal or, perhaps preferably, constitutional or even international framework.  7 
As soon as discussion moves beyond these relatively abstract formulations, disagree-
ment invariably ensues. There is, it seems, a consensus that there are indeed criteria for 
what counts as a criminal justice system which is genuinely “in keeping with a modern 
constitutional democracy”8 yet only a limited consensus about what those criteria might 
be.  
 
In this paper, I am not going to engage in any general analysis of these normative 
issues. Rather, I want to focus on just one matter which, on almost any plausible view, 
seems central to the democratic aspirations of a criminal justice system. This is its capac-
ity to respond effectively and even-handedly to the harms and rights violations repre-
sented by criminal conduct without resorting to measures which in effect negate the de-
mocratic membership and entitlements of offenders.9 Normatively, in other words, we 
might expect liberal-democratic criminal justice to aspire to be reintegrative and inclu-
                                                                                                                                  
term “democracy” or “democratic,” the recent literature in English is dominated by versions of, 
broadly speaking, liberalism. Here I would include analyses like that of Antony Duff which move 
some way in the direction of communitarianism, as well as the republican theory of John Braith-
waite and Philip Pettit; John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts (Oxford University 
Press, 1990); Antony Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge University Press, 1986); Punishment, 
Communication and Community (Oxford University Press, 2001); Nicola Lacey, State Punishment 
(London: Routledge, 1988). 
6For example Pablo de Greiff, ed., Democracy and Punishment Special Issue, Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review 5 (2002) : 321-600. 
7To avoid becoming embroiled in a lengthy preface which would subvert my main purposes, I 
will set out from a broad definition of democracy as a set of values relating to ideal governance 
structures that are informed by a concern with the following matters (albeit in varying configura-
tions): representation of, and responsiveness to, the will of citizens; direct or indirect participa-
tion of citizens in decision making; accountability of officials for proper conduct and effective de-
livery of policies in the public interest; adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
This broad conception implies the relevance of the evaluative benchmark of democratic values to 
non-state mechanisms of delivering social control. The significance of practices such as private se-
curity in corporate or community hands, mediation and restorative justice alongside state-
delivered criminal justice now place these institutions at the core of any normative project con-
cerned with the democratic credentials of social governance (see for example Les Johnston and 
Clifford Shearing, Governing Security [London: Routledge, 2003]). My main focus in this paper is 
on the state criminal justice system, but many of the issues which I raise would be equally rele-
vant to the non-state diaspora of social control. 
8Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach (London: Sage, 
2006), p.98. 
9I use this formulation rather than the more elegant “citizenship” because I take it that a liberal-
democratic framework would accord essentially the same entitlements to citizens and non-
citizens in the criminal justice context. 
  2 sionary rather than stigmatizing and exclusionary. And here we encounter one of the 
most troubling empirical paradoxes of contemporary democratic criminal justice. For the 
fact is that, in many countries, criminal justice policy has been driven in an exclusionary 
direction with – perhaps even because of – popular, and hence literally democratic, sup-
port.  
 
This mismatch between the apparent ideals of democratic criminal justice and 
the political dynamics of criminal justice in some societies raises a broader set of ques-
tions which I want to take as my general theme: what are the institutional preconditions 
for the realization of values such as penal moderation or inclusionary practices in crimi-
nal justice? Clearly, there is a connection between ideals and the development of institu-
tions suitable to their delivery. But the linkage is far from straightforward: the long his-
tory of idealistic institutional reform is after all, littered with unintended consequences. 
This makes it especially regrettable that this second, institutional question has proved to 
be of relatively little interest to political philosophers (though there are of course some 
honorable exceptions, notably Jeremy Bentham).10 It is true, of course, that mid-level 
questions about the ideal or, at least, more democratic design of criminal law and penal 
institutions have been central to the concerns of criminal justice scholars and criminolo-
gists. Think, for example, of the extensive literature on sentencing reform, published in 
many countries from the late 1970s on, which advocated institutions like sentencing 
commissions as more reliable and accountable deliverers than courts and legislatures of 
even-handed sentencing practice consistent with neo-classical penal ideals;11 of prescrip-
tions for policing reform;12 or of debates about creating institutions of restorative jus-
tice.13 These relatively concrete questions have increasingly found their way into the 
normative literature, and with them has come a more explicit confrontation with the 
tricky question of the relationship between ideal theory and the distinctly non-ideal con-
ditions in which we have to try to realise our ideals.14  
                                           
 
But is such a concern with the design of criminal justice practices adequate to a 
full understanding of the institutional preconditions of a humane and moderate criminal 
justice system? My argument is that our analysis of institutional preconditions needs to 
move to a higher level of generality, beyond criminal justice institutions themselves. The 
reason for this is very simple. Criminal justice is no more autonomous institutionally 
and practically than it is discrete theoretically: just as the ideals which motivate our nor-
mative theories of criminal justice are drawn from broad democratic, political and moral 
theories, so the actors and institutions which enable and constrain the pursuit of our cri-
 
10Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros, eds., The Trial on Trial I: 
Truth and Due Process ; II: Judgment and Calling to Account (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004 and 
2005, respectively); Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990, op. cit., note 5; Philip Pettit, ‘Is Criminal Justice 
Feasible?’ in de Greiff, ed., 2002, op. cit., note 6, pp. 427-50. 
11Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); Michael Tonry Sentencing 
Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
12See for example Trevor Jones, Tim Newburn and David J. Smith, “Policing and the Idea of De-
mocracy,” British Journal of Criminology 36 (1996): 182-98. 
13John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge University Press,1989); Responsive 
Regulation (Oxford Univeristy Press, 2002). 
14See in particular Duff, 1986, op. cit., note 6. 
  3 minal justice ideals operate within a broad socioeconomic and political context which in 
turn shapes their capacities. Without a sense of this broader context, our normative pro-
jects are liable to misfire. As Philip Pettit has put it, there is a risk that “… the main posi-
tions in penal philosophy are condemned to irrelevance under current institutional ar-
rangements.”15 I agree with Pettit that “[t]hose who defend those positions have a re-
sponsibility to consider whether their ideals can be made politically feasible.”16 But I 
want to argue that our conception of the conditions of political feasibility needs to be 
drawn more broadly than has so far tended to be the case.  
 
Responsiveness and inclusion: competing ideals under prevailing conditions? 
 
In the rest of the paper, I want to consider how we might work to a better under-
standing of the broad question of the conditions under which political systems are able 
to combine, in their penal policy, a respect for democratic responsiveness and social in-
clusion: or, to put it the other way round, the conditions under which governments are 
likely to construct – in the name of democracy – a system in which the impact of crimi-
nalization and imprisonment is patterned along lines of socio-economic advantage or 
group membership in such a way as to feed strongly into the dynamics of social exclu-
sion of certain social groups. 
 
This question illustrates an apparent tension in the comfortable assumption un-
derlying much normative literature: the assumption that there is necessarily a positive 
correlation between the instantiation of liberal democracy and a humane criminal justice 
system. From this optimistic, liberal-rationalist perspective, one of the most perplexing 
issues of contemporary criminal justice policy in many countries is the frequent clash be-
tween a popular demand for extensive and punitive criminalization and the inclusion-
ary precepts of ideal theory. It is worth noting that these inclusionary precepts are 
backed up by criminological research on the effectiveness of punishment.17 Even within 
“official” (i.e., administrative, government-sponsored) criminology, it is next to a con-
ventional wisdom, for example, that increased imprisonment rates make at best – to put 
it mildly – only a modest contribution to reducing crime, particularly when judged in 
the light of their very substantial economic and human costs.18 One recent commentator 
has gone so far as to argue that “criminal justice policy is largely irrelevant as a means of 
reducing crime.”19 This would suggest that high rates of imprisonment offend against 
                                            
15Pettit, 2002, op. cit., note 14: 449. 
16Ibid., 449-50. 
17See for example Jock Young, The Exclusive Society (London: Sage, 1999) Chapter 5; Robert Rei-
ner, Law and Order: An Honest Citizen’s Guide to Crime and Control (Oxford: Polity Press, 2007) 
Chapter 5; A. Doob and C. Webster, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypo-
thesis,” Crime and Justice 30 Michael Tonry, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
18Home Office, Making Punishments Work (London: Home Office) para 1.66 (estimating that the 
prison population would have to rise by 15 percent to achieve a reduction of 1 percent in crime); 
W. Spelman, “Jobs or jails? The crime drop in Texas,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 24 
(2005): 133-65; “The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion,” in A. Blumstein and J. Wallman, 
eds., The Crime Drop in America (Cambridge University Press, 2000; B. Western, Punishment and In-
equality in America (New York: Russell Sage, 2006).  
19Richard Garside, “Right for the Wrong Reasons,” (London: Crime and Society Foundation, 
2006). 
  4 the value of autonomy and liberal principles of parsimony in punishment. Yet, in some 
countries at certain times – the UK and the U.S. are, unfortunately, contemporary exam-
ples - this frequently rediscovered insight goes hand in hand with high levels of popular 
support for expansion of the prison system. This support is often, of course, framed in 
terms of the moral currency of desert. But no dispassionate observer could fail to be 
struck by the cultural and temporal variability of judgments of what is deserved, and 
this should give pause to anyone concerned about the sorts of limits to state punishment 
to which liberals are committed. What broad socio-economic and political conditions 
structure such waxing and waning of popular conceptions of desert? And how do differ-
ent institutional structures affect the way in which such popular conceptions feed into 
the development and implementation of policy? It seems unlikely that we could devise 
an effective liberal case for decarceration without understanding factors such as these.  
 
One of the most basic tenets of democracy is the need for accountability – and 
hence, ideally, responsiveness – of governments to the views and experiences of the elec-
torate. But the degree to which these views and experiences are regarded as appropri-
ately subject to mediation by expertise, distance, the constraints of an entrenched set of 
rights, and a host of other factors, varies within different versions of both democratic 
theory and democratic system. While accountability and responsiveness are, in different 
guises, constants in democratic theory, they are in potential conflict with other values 
such as the aspiration to foster an inclusionary criminal justice policy. And this conflict 
may be accentuated by the particular institutional constraints under which different 
sorts of democratic governments operate. If we are to explore the potential conflicts 
prompted by the link between the democratic value of responsiveness and the electoral 
disciplines presented by a popular demand for penal severity, we need to interpret the 
question about the “political feasibility” of criminal justice broadly. This means asking 
questions not only about, say, the sort of sentencing institution best adapted to deliver-
ing just and parsimonious punishments, but also about the sorts of democratic institu-
tions most likely to produce stable support for that kind of sentencing institution.  
 
Crime, Economy and Society in “Late Modern” Western Countries: Continental Inclu-
sion and Anglo-Saxon Exclusion? 
 
Within the last decade, there has been a significant increase in criminal justice 
scholarship that tries to get to grips with what we might call the big socio-economic pic-
ture within which criminal justice policy has developed in western democracies. Two 
outstanding examples are David Garland’s The Culture of Control and Jock Young’s The 
Exclusive Society.20 Both accounts chart the marked loss of faith, from the 1970s on, in 
many western democracies, of the optimistic, reformist “penal modernism” or “penal 
welfarism” which dominated criminal justice policy for most of the twentieth century. In 
the context – particularly in the years after the Second World War – of the development 
of welfare states, of economic growth, and of very high levels employment, it was possi-
ble in many countries to construct and sustain a criminal justice policy which was, in 
Young’s terms, inclusive. Though the most serious offenders were incarcerated (or 
worse…), the emphasis for the vast majority of offenders was on rehabilitation and rein-
tegration. This equilibrium was facilitated by moderate rates of actual crime and by the 
                                            
20Oxford University Press, 2001; London: Sage, 1999. 
  5 fact that, in a strongly socially and spatially stratified world, the (much smaller than to-
day) middle classes were relatively insulated from the effects of crime. In this context, 
crime was not a strongly politicized issue: there was a reasonably high degree of faith in 
– indeed deference towards – the expertise of criminal justice professionals and the com-
petence of politicians.  
 
With the global economic changes which began in the 1970s – recession, the con-
traction or even collapse of manufacturing industries, the growth of unemployment and 
the creation of a large sector of people either long-term unemployed or employed in in-
secure forms of work – the consensus which had sustained penal modernism began to 
erode. This was, significantly, accompanied by significant rises in recorded crime across 
Western countries (it is much to the credit of both Garland and Young that they incor-
porate crime rates – all too often the unmentioned “elephant in the room” in progressive 
criminology – into their analyses).21 As crime – the experience of criminal victimization, 
and of managing the risk and fear of it – became a normal feature of everyday life for the 
economically secure, crime became an increasingly politicized issue.  
 
Garland suggests that these broad economic and cultural changes prompted, at 
least in the United States, a general move towards a “culture of control,”22 in which a 
combination of repressive and managerial criminal justice strategies have become in-
creasingly salient to governments’ ability to present themselves as effective and elect-
able. The upshot has been the development of a strangely bifurcated criminal justice pol-
icy. On the one hand, we have what Garland calls “the criminology of the other”: a pow-
erful “outrage dynamic,” within which governments feeling constrained to “act out” 
more and more hysterically in response to the most serious crimes. 23 On the other hand, 
there has developed a “criminology of everyday life”: a much quieter “normalization” 
                                            
21In England and Wales, for example, the total recorded crime rate in 1995 was 11.5 times that in 
1955, while the rate of violent offenses was almost twenty times higher: Young, The Exclusive So-
ciety, op. cit., p. 64. On the political significance of crime rates, see also Robert Reiner, “Beyond 
Risk: A Lament for Social Democratic Criminology,” in Tim Newburn and Paul Rock, eds., The 
Politics of Crime Control (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) and, in greater empirical detail, his Law 
and Order, op. cit., Chapter 3. Reiner gives a useful summary of the persuasive evidence of the as-
sociation between unemployment and, yet more strongly, inequality and rates of crime, with the 
political and economic arrangements which lead to higher crime. 
22David Garland, The Culture of Control, op. cit., note 23; see also David Garland, ed., Mass Impris-
onment in the United States: Social causes and consequences (London: Sage, 2001); Jock Young, The Ex-
clusive Society, op. cit. For a further, detailed analysis of crime trends in the UK, see Tim New-
burn, “’Tough on Crime’: Penal Policy in England and Wales,” in Michael Tonry and A. Doob, 
eds., Crime and Justice 36 (forthcoming: University of Chicago Press 2007).  
23MacDonagh’s conception of the conditions conducive to the production of an outrage dynamic, 
the relevance of which to criminal justice has been identified by Philip Pettit, resonates with the 
environment within which criminal justice policy is formulated in what Garland calls “late mod-
ern” societies. “First, … the society in question is literate or at least has access to channels of com-
munication whereby exposure of an evil can be broadcast. Second.. the society embraces values 
such that people will generally be outraged by the evil in question… and third.. the society is de-
mocratically organized in such a way that politicians are going to be required, on pain of electoral 
sanction, to respond in a more or less persuasive way to the outrage”; Pettit, 2002, op. cit., note 14 
at pp. 432-3. 
  6 and actuarial management of less serious crime.24 How can this be explained? Garland 
offers us a theory grounded in the globalization of the world economy and accompany-
ing changes in patterns of employment,25 leading to a diminution in nation states’ power 
to control their increasingly interdependent economies. Combined with shifts in demog-
raphy and family structure, and reinforced by anxiety about crime as a significant di-
mension of risk to be managed in an increasingly unpredictable and culturally disem-
bedded world, these dynamics have led to a greater resort to criminal justice policy as a 
tool of social governance.  
 
Garland’s influential contribution26 has the great merit of offering large-scale hy-
potheses about the conditions which have brought about the “culture of control” which 
seems so decisively to constrain the development of criminal justice policy in some 
countries. Yet, in terms of marshalling our socio-economic and institutional analysis in 
the service of our ideals, his argument seems a counsel of despair. If the dynamics of pe-
nal populism are a structural feature of “late modern” society, all avenues for institu-
tional reform designed to counter the culture of control seem blocked. There is however 
strong reason to resist such a dystopian conclusion, at least in this monolithic form. For, 
as Lucia Zedner pointed out in an astute review, in his frequent slippage between analy-
sis of data based primarily on the U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, British) experience, and 
references to “late modern societies,” Garland risks elevating an explanatory framework 
largely informed by the specificities of the U.S. situation to the status of a general theory 
of penal dynamics in the late modern world.27 As Young is more careful to point out28 – 
on the basis of an analysis focusing on many of the same socio-economic changes, in-
cluding significant, and proportionately comparable, rises in recorded crime – there are 
in fact striking differences in the extent to which even countries fitting most closely Gar-
land’s explanatory model have responded in terms of a severe penal populism.  
 
Even as between Britain and the U.S., both of which fit Garland’s pattern rela-
tively closely, the differences in terms of the overall scale of both recorded crime and 
punishment are striking. Countries like Denmark, Sweden, Germany or Canada fit Gar-
land’s analysis yet less accurately.29 To take just one illustrative comparison, the incar-
                                            
24See Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, “The New Penology,” Criminology 39 (1992): 449-74; 
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime (2006). 
25See in more detail Garland, The Culture of Control, op. cit., note 23, Chapter 4. 
26The Culture of Control, op. cit., note 23. 
27See Lucia Zedner, “Dangers of Dystopia,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2002); see also James Q. 
Whitman, Harsh Justice (Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 203-5. 
28Acknowledging the need to take note of “the demands of specificity and [to] contrast… the ma-
terial and cultural situations in Western Europe and the United States,” Young further observes: 
“No doubt such contrast is over-schematic, for the differences within Western Europe are im-
mense; but the constant tendency to generalize from the United States to Europe, without ac-
knowledging the profound cultural differences, has to be resisted”; The Exclusive Society, op. cit., 
note 23, p.27. 
29See for example Michael Tonry, “Why Aren’t German Penal Policies Harsher and Imprisonment 
Rates Higher” German Law Journal 5,10 (2004); Tonry gives strong evidence that rises in penality 
are not caused by rizing crime; see particularly Figure 1. For further evidence that trends in pe-
nality are not directly related to trends in crime, see Tim Newburn, “’Tough on Crime’: Penal Pol-
icy in England and Wales,” op. cit., pp.9ff, 27. 
  7 ceration rate across the developed world last year ranged from 62 per 100,000 of the 
population (in Japan) to 737 in the U.S.A., with the UK, at a rate of 148, enjoying the du-
bious distinction of having the highest incarceration rate in the EU. Sweden (at 82) and 
Germany (at 94) still enjoy markedly lower levels,30 notwithstanding recent rises in the 
imprisonment rate in most countries (a trend to which Canada is an honorable excep-
tion, having reduced its imprisonment rate from 131 in 1994-95 to 107 in 2006.) Yet these 
countries have also experienced most of the factors to which Garland accords explana-
tory priority: the shocks of a global recession in the context of an increasingly interna-
tionalized economy and strong competition from emerging economies like China, South 
Korea and India; changes in levels of social deference premised on increasing relative so-
cial equality, education and prosperity in the postwar era; changes in family and demo-
graphic structure; the influence of mass communications and of a market economy 
which fosters a society based on a culture of individual consumption. Not all “late mod-
ern” democracies have reacted by plumping for a neo-liberal politics, “rolling back the 
state” and cutting public spending on welfare provision. And many countries have man-
aged to sustain a relatively moderate, inclusionary criminal justice system through the 
period in which the British and American systems have, albeit at different speeds and to 
different degrees, been moving towards a criminal justice system which fosters Young’s 
“exclusive society.” Are there, therefore, any lessons which can be learned from com-
parative research on the differences between the criminal justice systems of democratic 
societies at relatively similar levels of economic development?  
 
“Harsh Justice”: socio-cultural origins of inclusion and exclusion? 
 
In pursuing this question, we confront the unfortunate fact that macro-level com-
parative research on criminal justice is relatively thin on the ground.31 A few scholars 
have, however, been willing to make the considerable investment required to engage in 
this kind of work, and it is therefore worth reviewing some of their conclusions.32 A 
                                            
30Comparisons of rates of recorded crime in different countries are notoriously problematic, but 
homicide rates are generally agreed to be broadly comparable, and it is therefore worth noting 
the yet starker international contrasts here. Average homicide rates between 1999-2001 ranged 
from 55.86 per 100,000 of the population in South Africa to 1.02 in Denmark, with a number of 
transitional societies (Russia, 22.05; Lithuania, 10.62) exceeding the U.S. rate (5.56), itself more 
than three times that of the UK (1.61) (Barclay and Tavares, op. cit., Table 1.1). As Young notes, 
there is however no direct correlation in trends in recorded crime and severity of penal response: 
The Exclusive Society, op. cit., note 23, p. 144-5; indeed, the decline in recorded crime in many 
western countries between 1993 and 1995 was not associated with any general mitigation of the 
scale of punishment: ibid., p. 122, pp.142-5: see also the tables provided by Garland, The Culture of 
Control, op. cit., note 23, pp.208-9. See also the tables at the end of this paper. 
31See Nicola Lacey, “Historicizing Contrasts in Tolerance,” in Tim Newburn and Paul Rock, eds., 
The Politics of Crime Control (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
32No survey of the field would be complete without reference to Freda Adler’s Nations Not Ob-
sessed with Crime (Littleton CO: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1988). On the basis of OECD crime figures, 
Adler selected ten contrasting societies marked by their relatively low crime levels and moderate 
criminal justice policies. Though her quantitative analysis of a range of socio-economic indicators 
revealed virtually no shared features of these societies, she concluded, on the basis of her quali-
tative analysis, that they were marked both by unusually high levels of popular participation in 
criminal justice policymaking and delivery, and – yet more strongly – by highly developed infor-
  8 helpful starting point is James Q. Whitman’s Harsh Justice. Whitman’s analysis sets out 
from what we might call the “democratic paradox” of contemporary U.S. criminal jus-
tice. The U.S.A. stands not only as the world’s one superpower but also as a country 
with a long democratic tradition, and one which prides itself on its robust constitutional 
culture and respect for civil rights. Yet its criminal justice system is, in significant re-
spects, of the sort which we should expect to find not in one of the world’s great democ-
racies but rather in one of the countries whose repressive regimes the U.S.A. so loudly 
decries (if unevenly acts against) in its foreign policy. In quantitative and in qualitative 
terms, punishment in the U.S.A. amounts to harsh and exclusionary justice indeed. Both 
the record and ever-rising prison population and the uneven distribution of the burdens 
of the system are striking, with the proportion of young black males now incarcerated 
inviting functional comparison with the institution of slavery.33 Moreover the conditions 
of life in many U.S. prisons are staggeringly harsh: overcrowding is widespread, rape 
and other forms of violence endemic, and constructive prison regimes rare.34 On almost 
any plausible version of democratic theory, the U.S. criminal justice system exhibits 
some catastrophic flaws: in terms of respect for human rights, in terms of effective use of 
resources in the public interest, in terms of consolidating structural social exclusion of 
certain sectors of the population – notably young black men. 
 
How, Whitman asks, has the U.S., with its image of itself so strongly bound up 
with the notion of progress, civilization, humanity, ended up with one of the world’s 
harshest and most degrading criminal justice systems? The answer, he suggests, is to be 
found in a comparison between the long-range development of the criminal justice sys-
tems in European countries such as France and Germany and in the U.S.A., and of the 
differing sensibilities which shaped their paths to modern democracy. To paint with 
very broad brushstrokes, his explanation is as follows: before the great movements of 
Enlightenment-inspired reform in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the cri-
minal justice systems of the continent of Europe, like other social institutions, were in-
herently status-based. The bulk of punishment being carried out against those of low so-
cial status, and being oriented to their further degradation within an intensely hierarchi-
                                                                                                                                  
mal institutions of social control. While these conclusions are plausible and consistent with other 
criminological studies, including those on which I shall concentrate, I would argue that Adler’s 
study has some methodological features which should make us cautious about relying too 
strongly on her findings – and in particular on the negative findings of her quantitative analysis. 
In particular, her method of comparing starkly different societies (not all of them democratic) 
seems less well designed to elicit the sorts of institutional insights I am interested in than is an in-
depth comparison of relatively similar societies exhibiting markedly different levels of obsession 
with crime, such as that of Whitman (see below).  
33See Whitman, Harsh Justice, op. cit., note 29, p. 3, Chapter 2; Garland, The Culture of Control, op. 
cit., note 23, Chapters 5 and 6, pp. 208-9; Jerome Bruner, “Do Not Pass Go” (review of Garland), 
New York Review of Books 50 (Sept. 29, 2003); Marcellus Andrews, “Punishment, markets, and the 
American model: an essay on a new American dilemma,” in Seán McConville, ed., The Use of 
Punishment (Collompton: Willan Publishing, 2003), pp. 116-148. 
34For an eloquent – and horrifying – literary depiction of life in a U.S. jail, see Tom Wolfe, A Man 
in Full (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1998). A glimpse of the usually closed world of prison life, 
and of the inhumanity with which the U.S. regards it as appropriate to treat even unconvicted 
carceral inmates, was recently to be had on the world’s television screens with the transmission 
of images of detainees - shackled, bound, shuffling - at the Guantánamo Camp Delta in Cuba. 
  9 cal, non-democratic social structure, many punishments – think for example of the range 
of corporal punishments which formed the core of the penal repertoire – were vividly, 
and deliberately, humiliating. Moreover, there was a clear and elaborate set of distinc-
tions between high- and low-status penalties. By today’s standards, of course, punish-
ments for those of higher social status were also brutal. The key point, however, is that 
there was a distinction, and that punishment was regarded as an essentially, and justifi-
ably, degrading phenomenon.  
 
But with the turn against the bloody ancien régime associated with modernization, 
codification and the political culture of the Rechtsstaat, there was a decisive turn away 
from these degrading forms of punishment, as there also was from practices such as tor-
ture. Indeed, aiming for dignity in punishment and rejecting the old practices of degra-
dation became one of the self-conscious marks of the new civilization and its emerging 
democratic sensibility. The trajectory, therefore, was a gradual levelling up: a generaliza-
tion of the high-status, more respectful and humane forms of punishment. Through 
many twists and turns of history, the association of degradation in punishment with an 
older, uncivilized model of society now decisively rejected, gave birth to and sustained, 
in both France and Germany, a relatively mild penal system. As Liora Lazarus has 
shown in relation to Germany, it also generated a penal system that is regarded as 
strongly accountable to the courts for reaching constitutionally and otherwise appropri-
ate standards of respect and treatment: the Rechsstaat implies that state coercion must 
have constitutional justification.35  
 
In the U.S.A., by contrast, there was never a revolutionary moment in which a 
key part of the self-conception of the new order was a rejection of an older, indigenous, 
status-based society with its implication of appropriate degradation in punishment. This 
was for the simple reason that no such historical experience existed to be rejected. There 
was, of course, the institution of slavery. But this lasted well into the late modern period, 
and indeed cast its own shadow on the development of U.S. penal practice.36 In the early 
context of a society of settlers distributed across a huge space, we might further suggest 
that the imperatives of social order favored severity in punishment and moreover pun-
ishment oriented primarily to exclusion of the deviant rather than to social reintegration. 
This is not, of course, to argue that this path is an inevitable one for newly founded so-
cieties located in a large and perhaps hostile terrain. As John Braithwaite has argued, the 
Australian experience was different, with the experience of mutual dependence foster-
ing a culture of “mateship” which, along with economic imperatives in a very sparsely 
populated country, favored – at least for the settlers… – inclusionary over exclusionary 
                                            
35For an excellent description and analysis of these features of the contemporary German prison 
system, see Lazarus’s Contrasting Prisoners’ Rights (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
36See Whitman, Harsh Justice, op. cit., note 29, pp 11, 173-7, 198-9; for a further analysis of the cul-
tural and historical roots of American punitiveness, see Dario Melossi, “The Cultural Embedded-
ness of Social Control,” in Tim Newburn and Richard Sparks, eds., Criminal Justice and Political 
Cultures (Collompton, Willan Publishing 2004), pp. 80-103; on the “cultural” slant of Whitman’s 
analyis, and the specific relevance of the history of slavery in the U.S., see the exchange between 
Garland and Whitman, “Capital Punishment and American Culture,” “Response to Garland,” 
Punishment and Society 7 (2005) : 347 and 389, respectively. 
  10 dynamics in mechanisms of social control.37 In America, by contrast, the specific condi-
tions – notably the existence of a substantial, formally excluded population of slaves, in 
stark contrast to the Australian trajectory of gradual socio-political inclusion of convicts 
from a relatively early stage – favored the development of a harsh, exclusionary and de-
grading penal system.  
 
For Whitman, however, it is the absence of a rejected local history of premodern 
status-based hierarchy which implies the absence of what in Europe was a crucial dy-
namic in shaping the move towards a humane and legally accountable penal system. 
Though defining itself in opposition to the hierarchical societies of Europe and strongly 
attached to status-egalitarianism, the new America opted gradually for a levelling down 
of punishment, generalizing low- rather than high-status penalties. The difference be-
tween the two families of systems is vividly symbolized in the generalization of behead-
ing and of hanging as the modes of execution in the criminal justice systems of Europe 
and of Britain and the U.S. respectively.  
 
From cultural to political and economic analysis: institutional variables bearing on 
the capacity to deliver inclusionary criminal justice policies in different forms of 
democracy 
 
This is not the place for a full analysis or critique of Whitman’s thesis. But cer-
tainly, if we add in the British case,38 questions may be raised about the weight he places 
on what we may call the “degradation hypothesis.” In Britain, after all, there was, if not 
a decisive revolutionary moment, at least a substantial rejection, towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, of the harsher features of the “bloody code,” with the gradual re-
forms from then through the early nineteenth century oriented to goals not dissimilar to 
those of the French or German systems. While formal codification of criminal law was 
never achieved (except in relation to Britain’s colonies…), the overt violence of corporal 
penalties and, eventually, of public hanging, was gradually rejected, while the large and 
unaccountable discretion inherent in the “ancien régime,” along with the harshness of its 
penalties and the wide scope for royal prerogatives of pardon and mercy, were gradual-
ly rationalized in a system oriented more firmly to predictability, certainty, formal jus-
tice and the rule of law. Though certainly not motivated primarily by an ideal of respect 
for persons, even the austere prison systems of the early Victorian era were informed by 
an essentially humane view of prisoners as capable of reshaping their characters within 
a penal environment appropriately calibrated towards repentance and reform.39 This 
                                            
37“Crime in a Convict Republic,” Modern Law Review 64 (2001): 11. 
38Whitman does not purport to offer a general theory of penal harshness and in particular does 
not make any claim to explain the British case, which arguably lies outside the four corners of his 
explanatory hypothesis because, unlike France, Germany and the U.S.A., it did not experience 
any form of political revolution in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. It seems fair, however, 
to understand him as making a general argument that traditions of social hierarchy have an im-
pact on practices of punishment, and to this extent to evaluate his thesis in relation to other sys-
tems. 
39See Martin Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal (Cambridge University Press, 1991). Such hu-
manitarian instincts also shaped reform debates in early nineteenth-century America, with the 
British prison regimes themselves influenced by the American example: see Michael Ignatieff, A 
  11 was a system in which offenders’ incipient status as citizens rather than mere subjects 
was already discernible, and it was informed by a desire to reclaim offenders for inclu-
sion in mainstream society – a desire that would gradually come to dominate modern 
penal policy in most developed countries right up to the 1970s. This dynamic had to do 
both with the political movement towards a more democratic governmental structure, 
and with broad cultural changes in mentality and sensibility which, in Britain as in the 
rest of Europe, decisively affected factors such as the attitude to violence.40  
 
Yet despite these analogies between British and continental political history, Brit-
ain’s criminal justice system today appears to be far less sensitive than, say, that of Ger-
many to the need to ensure humanity in punishment. Indeed, in terms of indices like im-
prisonment rates, conditions of imprisonment, legal redress available to prisoners and 
salience of criminal justice policy to politics, one might say that the British system looks 
more like its American than its German cousin, or at least constitutes a hybrid case. This 
implies that the degradation hypothesis is not the only explanatory factor needed to pro-
duce an adequate account of contrasts in penal severity across modern systems at rela-
tively similar levels of economic development. Indeed, it suggests that we need to look 
beyond cultural explanatory factors such as the sensibility to degradation. 
 
The degradation thesis is not, however, the only explanatory factor in Whitman’s 
account. Alongside it sits an argument about the distinction between “weak” and 
“strong” states. As Whitman notes, Durkheim’s prediction that the development of 
modernity and, in particular, the contractualization of social relations towards a “hori-
zontal” social culture would lead to mildness in punishment is decisively disproved by 
the American case.41 Rather, curiously, Americans’ attachment to status egalitarianism 
and their general suspicion of state power appear to have conduced to harshness in pun-
ishment. The German recognition of the strong state’s legitimate right to proscribe a 
wide range of forms of conduct is balanced by an accompanying recognition of the 
state’s right to exercise its prerogative of mercy. In the U.S., by contrast, any generalized 
prerogative of clemency de haut en bas would be unthinkable: it is entirely inconsistent 
with the status egalitarian and minimal state mentality. It is significant for this aspect of 
Whitman’s argument that the nineteenth-century reforms in Britain and America, but 
not in Europe, involved a rejection of the prerogative of mercy other than in exceptional 
cases.42 The rationale for criminal punishment, therefore, resides not in any sovereign 
power of the state, but rather in the inherent evil of crime – an attitude which itself con-
duces to a levelling up of harshness.  
 
The weak-strong state distinction adds a valuable dimension to Whitman’s an-
alysis in that it points us towards differences in institutional structure as potentially im-
                                                                                                                                  
Just Measure of Pain (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989); Norval Morris and David J. Rothman, The 
Oxford History of the Prison (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
40See Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, Volumes I and II (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1978, 
1982; first published 1939); V.A.C. Gatrell, The Hanging Tree (Oxford University Press, 1994); Mar-
tin Wiener, Men of Blood (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
41Harsh Justice, op. cit., note 29, pp. 194-9. 
42In the U.S., as in the UK, certain powers of clemency have survived, but they tend to be re-
garded with suspicion. A recent example would be Bill Clinton’s use of the presidential pardon 
on leaving office, which attracted a great deal of criticism.  
  12 portant explanatory variables. But the distinction is not, in my view, entirely satisfac-
tory. For example, in terms of one of Whitman’s key criteria of “strength” – relative au-
tonomy in policymaking and implementation – the UK, even if not the U.S.,43 is in many 
respects a strong state. This is because, under certain electoral contingencies, given the 
simple parliamentary structure of the UK with its strong form of party discipline, the 
dominance of the executive is such as to allow it to push through its policies in the face 
of both popular and other-party opposition. In explaining institutional constraints on 
criminal justice policy, it might have been more productive to focus on specific variables 
such as the distribution of veto points or complex decision-making structures within 
particular political contexts.44 But Whitman’s insight that contemporary differences 
among the penal systems of relatively similar societies may have long historical roots is 
of the first importance. For historical differences (in the light of institutional path-
dependence) may help to explain the persistence of contrasts even amid an increasingly 
globalized and intensely economically interdependent world. There is no particular rea-
son to think, pace many criminal justice scholars,45 that globalization, communication or 
interdependence imply policy convergence. I therefore want to suggest that Whitman’s 
degradation thesis would be yet more illuminating if it was located within a more differ-
entiated institutional comparison rooted in an analysis of political economy – a field in 
which comparative studies are flourishing, and in which criminal justice scholars are 
showing a renewed interest.  
 
In another of the relatively rare examples of sustained comparative research 
which sets criminal justice in its broader political-institutional and economic context, 
David Downes offered an analysis of the relatively tolerant penal culture which charac-
terized the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when increases in both record-
ed crime and penal severity were already marking the British criminal justice system.46 
Downes was rightly cautious about making sweeping claims for the power of an intan-
gible “culture of tolerance” in the Netherlands, while acknowledging that a tolerant and 
inclusionary attitude to the treatment of crime among powerful elites had been an im-
portant factor in sustaining moderation in penal policy.47 The Dutch political elite’s sup-
port for moderation and humanity was, in Downes’s view, itself sustained by the com-
plex socio-economic structure of “pillarization,” in which complementary “columns” “of 
denominationalism … guaranteed social order to a high degree on the basis of informal 
social controls.”48 The Netherlands’ structurally pillarized society exhibited a high de-
gree of group-based stratification: yet it was premised on a generalized norm of incorpo-
                                            
43Its particular structure makes the U.S. a relatively “strong” state in relation to foreign but not 
domestic policy. 
44Such as the impact of a multi-jurisdiction structure on criminal justice reform in the U.S.: see 
David Garland, “American Culture and Capital Punishment,” op. cit., note 37, p.362. 
45See for example Michael Tonry, “Symbol, Substance and Severity in Western Penal Policies,” 
Punishment and Society 3 (2001): 517-36 at pp. 527-31; Tim Newburn and Richard Sparks, eds., 
Criminal Justice and Political Cultures, op. cit., note 37. 
46David Downes, Contrasts in Tolerance (Oxford University Press, 1988). 
47On the dangers of confounding variables and explanatory concepts in invoking ideas such as 
‘culture,’ see David Nelken, “Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture,” Social and Legal Studies 4 
(1995): 435-52; see also Nelken, ed., Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). 
48Contrasts in Tolerance, op. cit., note 47, p. 192. 
  13 ration and mutual respect which implied the tolerant, parsimonious and civilized penal 
system, as well as the tight degree of multi-agency coordination and state steering 
through the prosecution process, which Downes charted. With the gradual breakdown 
of pillarization, the dynamics that sustained parsimony in the scale and scope of pun-
ishment began to erode: as the power of informal social controls fell, so the demand for 
formal controls rose.49 But, crucially, Downes saw no sign that the demand for an in-
crease in formal social controls was accompanied by any erosion of the other dimension 
of tolerance: i.e., the belief that the quality of punishment should be humane, respectful 
and consistent with its subjects’ status as members of the polity. While in Britain, the 
analogous pressures to expand the scale of punishment had led inexorably to an increase 
in inhumanity via overcrowded prisons, which became dumping grounds for the social-
ly excluded, in Downes’s analysis, the Dutch demand for expansion in punishment had 
issued in a number of well-coordinated attempts to preempt any such outcome through 
decisive policy measures.50  
 
What explains the difference? In trying to answer this question, I am fortunate to 
be able to draw on an impressive recent contribution to the relatively sparsely populated 
field of systematic comparative studies of criminal justice: Michael Cavadino’s and 
James Dignan’s Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach. In this book, Cavadino and Dig-
nan present systematic data from twelve countries on criminal justice variables such as 
imprisonment rates, youth justice arrangements and privatization policies.51 They set 
this information in the context of a broader typology of the political economy and social 
culture of each of the twelve countries. They group the twelve countries into four fami-
                                            
49At the time of his original research, Downes saw no sign that the demand for an increase in for-
mal social controls was accompanied by any erosion of the other dimension of tolerance: i.e., the 
belief that the quality of punishment should be humane, respectful and consistent with its sub-
jects’ status as members of the polity. While in Britain, the analogous pressures to expand the 
scale of punishment had led inexorably to an increase in inhumanity via overcrowded prisons, 
which became dumping grounds for the socially excluded, in Downes’s analysis, the Dutch de-
mand for expansion in punishment had issued in a number of well-coordinated attempts to pre-
empt any such outcome through decisive policy measures: Ibid., pp. 201-6. Sadly, his recent work 
suggests that, with increasing political pressure, humanity as well as moderation in Dutch pun-
ishment are now under serious threat: see David Downes, “Visions of Penal Control in the Neth-
erlands,” and Downes and René van Swaaningen, “The Road to Dystopia? Changes in the Penal 
Climate of the Netherlands,” both forthcoming in Michael Tonry and A. Doob, ed., Crime and Jus-
tice 36 (forthcoming: University of Chicago Press, 2007).  
50Ibid., pp. 201-6. 
51While the use of imprisonment rates as a tool of comparative penology has, as Cavadino and 
Dignan note (Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach, op. cit., pp. 4-10), limitations, they remain an 
indispensable starting point in any attempt to construct an index of penal harshness. Eoin O’Sul-
livan and Ian O’Donnell have recently shown, however, that – at least in the case of the Republic 
of Ireland – if diversion from technically non-criminal modes of incarceration such as asylums 
and Magdalen Homes is taken into account, the apparent rise in penality represented by impris-
onment data is turned on its head, since the overall level of coercive confinement over the last 
half century has in fact declined: “Coercive Confinement in the Republic of Ireland: The Waning 
of a Culture of Control,” Punishment and Society 9 (2007): 27-48. While Ireland seems likely to be a 
particularly striking case of this phenomenon, and while a shift towards overtly penal mecha-
nisms of confinement is itself significant, there is a real need for empirical investigation of this 
issue in other countries.  
  14 lies of political economy – neo-liberal (the U.S.A., South Africa, England and Wales, 
Australia, New Zealand), conservative-corporatist (Germany, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands), social-democratic (Sweden and Finland) and oriental-corporatist (Japan) – char-
acterized in terms of broad criteria such as form of economic and welfare-state organiza-
tion, extent of income and status differentials, degree of social inclusivity, political orien-
tation, degree of individualism.52 Extrapolating from their criminal justice data, and ap-
plying what they call a “radical pluralist analysis,” they demonstrate – as shown in Fig-
ure 1 - striking family resemblances along the lines of the typology, with neo-liberal po-
litical economies exhibiting the highest imprisonment rates, the lowest age of criminal 
responsibility, and the least cautious approach to prison privatization; and with conser-
vative-corporatist, then social-democratic, and finally oriental-corporatist countries 
placed on a descending scale towards moderation in penal policy. 
 
In one paper, I am not in a position to do justice to the richness of Cavadino’s 
and Dignan’s individual country surveys, though I shall refer to them from time to time. 
Rather, I want to build on their analysis. For, persuasive though their findings are, and 
much though I agree with their argument that “we need to understand both commonal-
ities and discontinuities between countries, and the reasons for them, if we are to make 
sense of penality…,”53 their account rests largely at the level of establishing correlations 
rather than explaining its mechanisms. In common with other work manifesting a very 
welcome revival of interest in political economy among criminologists – notably Robert 
Reiner’s Law and Order: An Honest Citizen’s Guide to Crime and Control54 - much of the ela-
borated causal argument – is focused on what we might call the cultural sociology of po-
litical economy: on issues such as burgeoning feelings of insecurity in the neo-liberal 
countries, the role of the mass media, anomie attendant on the experience of relative de-
privation and so on. Like Reiner, Garland and Young, Cavadino and Dignan most cer-
tainly demonstrate these cultural factors to be of importance. But, other than in relation 
to the welfare state (on which more below), they do not develop a systematic view of the 
linkages between the political-economic variables which might underpin these count-
ries’ systematically different criminal justice policies (and indeed which would justify 
thinking of them as related types). As Cavadino and Dignan themselves conclude, with 
                                            
52The overall picture is developed in Chapter 1 of Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach, op. cit., 
and is usefully summarized on the table on p. 33; see also M. Tonry and D. Farrington, eds., Crime 
and Punishment in Western Countries 1980-1999 (University of Chicago Press, 2005); Michael Tonry 
and A. Doob, eds., Crime and Justice 36 (forthcoming: University of Chicago Press, 2007).  
53Cavadino and Dignan op. cit., p. 3. 
54Oxford: Polity Press (forthcoming 2007); the same point could be made about both Young and 
Garland, op. cit. Even Newburn (Tim Newburn, “’Tough on Crime’: Penal Policy in England and 
Wales,” op. cit., pp. 34,36), while emphasizing the need to develop an account rooted in an un-
derstanding of political-economic structures, frames this in terms of the “cultural conditions” and 
“socio-cultural circumstances” underpinning the various political dynamics conducing to harsh-
ness. Michael Tonry (“Why Aren’t German Penal Policies Harsher and Imprisonment Rates 
Higher,” op. cit.) uses a framework which also gives emphasis not only to institutional variables 
such as meaningful separation of powers and political insulation of practices and processes, but 
also to cultural factors such as sensibility cycles, taste for moralism and, in relation to Canada, 
francophone culture and American oppositionalism. I agree that all of these are indeed striking 
variables; my point is simply that we need to try to understand the deeper structural and cultural 
conditions which give rise to them. 
  15 refreshing honesty: “Some patterns give rise to puzzles. One which continues to trouble 
us is this. We think we have demonstrated that the position of a country within our ty-
pology of political economies has an important effect on the punishment level of that 
country. But why, exactly?”55 They go on to note that an argument entirely at the level of 
differing “penal cultures” is unsatisfactory because there is no consistent correlation be-
tween public attitudes and political economy such as exists between political economy 
and level of punishment: Japan, for example, scores high on assessments of punitive 
public attitudes, but low on actual punitiveness, while exactly the opposite is the case in 
New Zealand.56 Yet without some sense of the reasons why some forms of political econ-
omy appear systematically to favor more moderate penal policies, we are not in a good 
position to begin to address the other question with which Cavadino and Dignan con-
clude their book: that of “whether penality is fated to become harsher and harsher – as it 
has been doing in most of the countries surveyed – or whether there are any lessons to 
be learnt from our studies which indicate how an ever more punitive future could be 
avoided, or might simply fail to come to pass.”57 
 
I want to argue that we can make some progress toward answering these ques-
tions by reading Cavadino’s and Dignan’s striking findings in the light of recent politi-
cal-economic analysis of comparative institutional advantage. In the Netherlands at the 
time of Downes’s study, the political economy depended on the stable integration of all 
social groups, albeit via a pillarized social structure: it amounted, in short, to what has 
been termed by political scientists Peter Hall and David Soskice as a “co-ordinated mar-
ket economy.”58 Such an economy, which functions in terms primarily of long-term rela-
tionships and stable structures of investment, not least in education and training, and 
which incorporates a wide range of social groups and institutions into a highly coordi-
nated governmental structure, has strong reason to opt for a relatively inclusionary cri-
minal justice system. It is a system premised on incorporation, and hence on the need to 
reintegrate offenders into society and economy.59 Such a system is, we might hypothe-
size, structurally less likely to opt for degradation or exclusionary stigmatization in pun-
ishment. Britain, by contrast, falls into Hall’s and Soskice’s model of a “liberal market 
economy.” Such economies – of which the purest form, significantly for any argument 
about criminal justice, is the U.S.A. – are typically more individualistic in structure, are 
less interventionist in regulatory stance, and depend far less strongly on the sorts of co-
                                            
55Cavadino and Dignan, op. cit., p. 339. 
56Ibid., pp. 30-31; see also Tim Newburn, “’Tough on Crime’: Penal Policy in England and 
Wales,” op. cit., p. 30, also sounds a note of caution about overplaying the role of public opinion 
and of the idea that it is media-driven, citing U.S. research by Beckett and Sasson which found 
that it was polliticians’ emphasis on crime that drove media reporting rather than the other way 
round (Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson, The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in 
America (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 2004 [2nd edition]). Once again, the interesting question is 
whether both media and political focus on crime are driven by other variables. 
57Ibid., p.340. 
58Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, “An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism,” in Hall and 
Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 1-68. 
59For an analysis of the impact of these dynamics on German criminal justice, see Nicola Lacey 
and Lucia Zedner, “Discourses of Community in Criminal Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 
(1995): 93-113. 
  16 ordinating institutions which are needed to sustain long-term economic and social rela-
tions. In these economies, flexibility and innovation, rather than stability and invest-
ment, form the backbone of comparative institutional advantage. It follows that, particu-
larly under conditions of surplus unskilled labor (conditions which liberal market 
economies are also more likely to produce), the costs of a harsh, exclusionary criminal 
justice system are less than they would be in a coordinated market economy.  
 
My suggestion is that the liberal/coordinated market economy distinction – 
which, significantly, maps neatly onto Cavadino’s and Dignan’s fourfold typology – 
may be a powerful tool in building an understanding of the inclusionary and exclusion-
ary dynamics of different criminal justice systems. For the distinction has an analytic 
reach into a wide range of interrelated political and economic institutions which charac-
terize particular national systems and which have their impact on criminal justice policy. 
A full analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, but it is possible here to suggest a 
number of more or less complex hypotheses which would be susceptible of – and worth 
– testing within this model. These various factors are closely intertwined, and hence dif-
ficult to separate in an analytically satisfactory way (see Figures 4 and 5, pp. 34-35, for a 
visual map of the linkages). But the following schematic account may give some idea of 
the sorts of issues that an analysis of comparative political economy would put on the 
agenda of scholars interested in the relationship between criminal justice and different 
varieties of democratic system: 
 
1) Political Systems: electoral arrangements and the bureaucracy 
 
The recognition that punishment must be justified might be thought to lie at the 
heart of the self-conception of a liberal-democratic modern society. Yet, as the contrasts 
unearthed in the comparative literature suggest, the urgency with which this need for 
justification is felt varies markedly across democratic systems. The tolerance of and in-
deed public support for “harsh justice” in the U.S.A. undoubtedly discloses a weaker 
popular disposition to question the state’s exercise of its power to punish than is sug-
gested by the nature of the Dutch public debate in the mid-1980s about how to reform 
the criminal justice system in the light of newly emerging crime problems associated 
with drugs.60 Yet, as Whitman acknowledges, this is on the face of it paradoxical, given 
the American disposition to be suspicious of state power. Nonetheless, given the increas-
ing salience of criminal justice to electoral politics, and the force of electoral discipline on 
democratic governments, it seems obvious that these contrasts in popular attitudes to 
punishment constitute an important explanatory variable in any attempt to understand 
the differences between contemporary penal systems in relatively similar societies. How 
directly they are reflected in the electoral system, and hence exert discipline on govern-
ing parties, is therefore likely to be an important factor in explaining the institutional ca-
pacity of different systems to sustain moderate criminal justice policies. 
 
In this context, it is interesting that there is, empirically, an association between 
coordinated market economies and proportionally representative (PR) electoral systems, 
and between liberal market economies and first-past-the-post, winner-take-all systems –
                                            
60Or by the elaborate system of German prisoners’ rights described by Lazarus, Contrasting Pris-
oners’ Rights, op. cit., note 36. 
  17 a difference which may itself feed into the relative “strength” of different kinds of politi-
cal economy under varying external conditions.61 To put it crudely, the “strength” (in 
the sense of policymaking autonomy) of coordinated market economies is rather regu-
larly constrained by the need to negotiate with groups incorporated in the governmental 
process. In this sense, we might say that coordinated market economies with PR systems 
are both more genuinely representative and more oriented to effective participation in 
and contribution to policymaking – at least for groups integrated within subsisting 
socio-political structures – than are liberal market economies whose electorate gets a 
one-shot say in policymaking at election time. But this consensus-building dynamic may 
make the coordinated market economies “stronger” in the sense of less heteronymous in 
the light of swings of popular opinion. While decisive winners of first-past-the-post elec-
tions in liberal market economies may feel relatively unconstrained by popular opinion 
early on in their terms, their unmediated accountability at the ballot box will make them 
highly sensitive to public opinion as elections loom. What is more, as party affiliations 
among the electorate weaken, governments’ increasing dependence on the approval of a 
large number of “floating” median voters, sufficiently affluent to regard crime as a 
threat to their well-being, may feed into the political salience of criminal justice.62 Under 
the sorts of economic and cultural conditions charted by Garland, and in the light of 
Young’s argument about the salience of increasing relative deprivation to both the scale 
and the perceived seriousness of crime problems, therefore, it may be that there is a 
stronger association between the politicization of criminal justice and the impact of pe-
nal populism in liberal market economies such as the U.S., with decisive implications for 
the harshness of punishment. 
 
It is also worth noting a further difference between the political systems to be 
found in liberal and coordinated market economies, itself correlated with the PR/ma-
joritarian distinction. In most coordinated market economies, deference to the expertise 
of the professional bureaucracy – i.e., the civil service, often including not only policy 
advisers, penal system officials and prosecutors but also judges – tends to be high. Bu-
reaucrats in these countries are not expected to be politically neutral. Rather, their politi-
cal affiliations are known: they shape their career paths according to the government of 
the day, but do not imply any block on career progression. Their social status has re-
mained generally high, and their expertise respected. This is in part because the coalition 
politics typical of PR systems implies a less polarized political environment in which 
governments feel less need to retain total control of policymaking. By contrast, particu-
larly in recent years, the tendency in majoritarian systems has been for governments to 
                                            
61See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). In his analysis of the survival of capital punishment in 
the U.S., David Garland has also pointed to the relevance of institutional dynamics of particular 
political systems, and in particular to the power of floating “median” voters and the difficulty of 
building an effective abolitionist strategy in a multi-jurisdictional polity: Garland, “Capital Pun-
ishment and American Culture,” op. cit., note 37, pp. 360, 362. 
62Cf. Paul Chevigny, “The Populism of Fear: Politics of Crime in the Americas,” Punishment and 
Society 5 (2003): 77; Bert Useem, Raymond V. Liedka and Anne Morrison Piehl, “Popular Support 
for the Prison Build-up,” Punishment and Society 5 (2003): 5; Mick Ryan, Penal Policy and Political 
Culture in England and Wales (Winchester: Waterside, 2003); J. Pratt, D. Brown, M. Brown, S. Halls-
worth and W. Morrison, eds., The New Punitiveness (Cullompton: Willan, 2005). 
  18 prefer to work with their own politically appointed advisers, and to ignore the advice of 
technically neutral civil servants wherever this is judged to interfere with the chances of 
electoral success or political expediency. In Britain, this has been particularly marked 
during the last thirty years, with power increasingly concentrated in Downing Street 
and the political wing of the Treasury: in the U.S., too, politicians and political appoint-
ees, rather than bureaucrats, have responsibility for most important fields of policymak-
ing. Despite some controversy about this politicization of the bureaucracy, the implica-
tions for a dilution of the status of the professional civil service are clear. And they have 
been particularly striking in the field of criminal justice. Professional civil servants who 
assert their independent judgment in opposition to what ministers see as politically ex-
pedient have been dealt with in increasingly peremptory – even personally abusive – 
terms.63  
 
This feeds into a dynamic in which politicans’ decisions become ever less insu-
lated from the flow of perceived public opinion – a factor which, as Michael Tonry has 
argued, has been a crucial driver of penal harshness in several countries.64 The difficulty 
here for politicians, however, is that – as one influential journalist recently put it – 
“Those who live by tabloid headlines must be ready to perish by them.”65 Once a pro-
fessional bureaucracy is undermined, one of the main tools for depoliticizing criminal 
justice is removed. And analogy with economic policy is instructive here. The current 
British Labour administration managed to effect some political insulation of the setting 
of interest rates by creating a Monetary Policy Committee located in the Bank of Eng-
land, and is forming a similar strategy in relation to planning policy. No such solution is 
possible in the field of criminal justice, where the role of experts – and notably of those 
within the public service – has been steadily undermined by politicans quick to seek 
electoral advantage by deriding expert opinion wherever it conflicts with what they take 
to be popular sentiment. While I have taken these examples from the UK, Cavadino’s 
and Dignan’s book identifies the strength of a professional bureaucracy, along with def-
erence to expertise, as two conditions key to the maintenance of moderate criminal jus-
tice policies in several of the corporatist and social democratic countries.66 
                                            
63In an infamous incident in the early 1990s, Michael Howard, then Home Secretary, deliberately 
breached convention by naming civil servant David Faulkner, architect of the moderate Criminal 
Justice Act 1991, deriding his views in a radio interview; more recently, Rod Morgan, an experi-
enced criminal justice scholar and professional, was rewarded for his independent-mindedness 
and professionalism by the decision not to renew his term as Head of the Youth Justice Board. 
64“Why Aren’t German Penal Policies Harsher and Imprisonment Rates Higher,” op. cit.; see also 
Tonry’s Punishment and Politics: Evidence and Emulation in the Making of English Crime Control Policy 
(Cullompton: Willan 2004).  
65Philip Stephens, “Crime, Punishment and Poetic Justice,” Financial Times, January 30, 2007, p. 
15. The comment was in relation to the Home Secretary John Reid. 
66See Cavadino and Dignan, op. cit., pp. 102, 105 (Germany); 122-3 (the Netherlands, where they 
argue that decline of faith in the professional bureaucracy was a key element in the rise of man-
agerialism and penal severity); 132 (France) 35-6, 151-2, 164 (Finland and Sweden); 180-3 (Japan). 
Conversely they note (p. 55), in relation to the U.S., that the weakness of professional authority 
and the personalized rather than bureaucratic character of American public life has fed into the 
politicization of criminal justice. Similarly, David Downes has noted in his work on the Nether-
lands the importance of bureaucratic authority to the establishment and maintenance of moder-
  19 To sum up: in liberal market economies with majoritarian electoral systems, par-
ticularly under conditions of relatively low trust in politicians, relatively low deference 
to the expertise of criminal justice professionals, and a weakening of the ideological di-
vide between political parties as they become increasingly focused on the median voter 
and correspondingly less able to make commitments to a stable party base, the unmedi-
ated responsiveness of politics to popular opinion in the adversarial context of the two-
party system makes it harder for governments to resist a ratcheting up of penal severity. 
As Newburn has shown in relation to the British case, these dynamics become particu-
larly strong where both parties take up a law and order agenda.67 In PR systems, where 
negotiation and consensus are central, and where incorporated groups can have greater 
confidence that their interests will be effectively represented in the bargaining process 
which characterizes coalition politics, the dynamics of penal populism may be easier to 
resist. And in PR systems, due to the discipline of coalition politics, in which bargains 
have to be struck before elections, voters can be more confident about what policy slate 
they are voting for – a striking difference from majoritarian systems, where a party with 
a comfortable majority is more or less unconstrained by its own manifesto once elected. 
(In criminal justice, a vivid example is that of the current Labour government’s spectacu-
lar turnaround on prison privatization: having fought the 1997 General Election on a 
platform of principled opposition to privatization, it was announced within a month of 
the election that all new prisons in England and Wales would be privately run.68) 
 
2) The structure of the economy: production regimes, labour markets, education and 
training, disparities of wealth 
 
In countries like Britain, notwithstanding a political history that might lead us to 
expect Whitman’s degradation hypothesis to have some explanatory power, the dynam-
ics of a liberal market economy have progressively eroded the anti-degradation sensibil-
ity. We can see, one might argue, the force of the anti-degradation sensibility at work in 
the early nineteenth-century penal reform movements, as in the penal welfare move-
ment of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; in the borstal system, in the 
development of probation, and in much else besides.69 (It is significant – and unsettling 
to Whitman’s degradation thesis – that we can also identify American analogues to these 
instances of humanitarian penal reformism.) But the influence of the dynamics of a lib-
eral market economy have increased markedly over the last thirty years, as many of the 
attitudes and values that sustained the postwar welfare state settlement have come to be 
eroded by a more aggressively market-oriented culture.70 This political culture is itself 
                                                                                                                                  
ate policies, and the association of its decline with the turn to harshness: Contrasts in Tolerance and 
“Visions of Penal Control in the Netherlands,” op. cit. 
67Tim Newburn, “’Tough on Crime’: Penal Policy in England and Wales,” op. cit., p.30ff. 
68Cavadino and Dignan, op. cit., p. 315. 
69See David Garland, Punishment and Welfare (Aldershot: Gower, 1985); Michael Ignatieff, A Just 
Measure of Pain (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). As Whitman also acknowledges, the differ-
ences between the U.S. and the French and German systems have become much starker since the 
collapse of the welfarist rehabilitative consensus in the early 1970s: see Harsh Justice, op. cit., note 
29, p. 193. 
70See Robert Reiner, “Beyond Risk: A Lament for Social Democratic Criminology,” op. cit., note 
24. 
  20 premised in part on the imperative of high performance amid increasing global econom-
ic competition, with the collapse of Fordist production regimes and the availability of 
cheap manufactured goods from countries like Singapore, South Korea and, more re-
cently, China and India. The inevitable upshot is structural economic insecurity for low-
skilled workers in advanced liberal market economies.71 In a short-term economic cul-
ture, the bottom third of the work force risks become a socially as well as economically 
excluded group.72  
 
In the coordinated market economies, by contrast, a longer-term economic cul-
ture appears to have survived the impact of increased international competition and the 
collapse of Fordism. Within the political economy of comparative advantage, this is seen 
as a function of several interlocking factors: the nature of the economic activities in 
which these countries have concentrated their efforts; the close incorporation of employ-
ers as well as unions in the management of the economy; and the implications of each of 
these factors for the structure of education and training. Unlike the increasingly flexibi-
lized and service-oriented economies of the liberal market economies, many coordinated 
market economies excel in producing high quality goods which depend on relatively 
technical and industry-specific, non-transferable skills. In this context, employers have 
strong reason to invest in education, training and apprenticeship systems. They also, 
crucially, have strong reason to use their considerable bargaining power with govern-
ment to press for generous welfare provision for workers who are temporarily unem-
ployed but whose skills remain necessary to the economy.73 With the higher levels of in-
vestment in education and training typical of these economies, which also demonstrate 
lower disparities of wealth and higher literacy rates,74 the costs of pursuing socially ex-
clusionary policies in areas such as criminal justice are relatively high. 
 
In the liberal market economies, increasing relative deprivation consequent on 
flexibilization of labor markets and growing disparities of both income and skills (see Fi-
gures 6, 7 and 8) pose, as Young has argued,75 a huge challenge for inclusionary criminal 
                                            
71On the sociological implications of this economic transformation, see Richard Sennett, The Cor-
rosion of Character (New York: Norton, 1998). 
72See C. Hale, “Economic Marginalisation and Social Exclusion,” in C. Hale, K. Hayward, A Wa-
hidin and E. Wincup, eds., Criminology (Oxford University Press, 2005): on the institutionalization 
of a “40:30:30” society of structural social exclusion, see also Will Hutton, The State We’re In (Lon-
don: Jonathan Cape, 1995). 
73In this context they also have a concern to maintain the incentives for new generations of work-
ers to make the considerable investment necessary to acquire these skills. 
74See Torben Iversen and David Soskice, “Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the 
Nineteenth Century” (typescript, Harvard University Department of Government, 2007) – a pa-
per which also explores the roots of varieties of capitalism into the distinctive structures of po-
litical and economic organization in the nineteenth century. 
75The Exclusive Society, op. cit., note 23; see in particular chapters 1, 2 and 7; on the criminological 
significance of relative deprivation, see also Robert Reiner, “Beyond Risk,” op. cit., note 24, and 
Law and Order, op. cit., Chapter 3. Reiner points out that increasing inequality appears to correlate 
not only with penal harshness but also with patterns of victimization which reinforce social ex-
clusion: see Danny Dorling, “Prime Suspect: Murder in Britain,” in P. Hillyard, C. Pantazis, S. 
Tombs and D. Gordon, eds., Beyond Criminology (London: Pluto, 2004), on the impact of recent 
  21 justice policies, particularly in a world in which mass communications and increased 
levels of education imply the cultural inclusion of the relatively deprived within the in-
dividualistic values of a consumer society from which they are economically excluded. 
This undoubtedly exacerbates what seems to be one of the most difficult challenges for a 
democracy to meet in sustaining a moderate criminal justice policy: the difficulty, as 
Richard Sennett has put it, of “showing mutual respect across the boundaries of inequal-
ity.”76 It is therefore no surprise that during this period we have seen not only a large in-
crease in the absolute and relative size of the harsher end of the British and American 
criminal justice systems, but also a weakening of political sensibilities in favor of human 
rights and decent conditions for prisoners. There comes a point, we might suggest, at 
which both the absolute situation of the disadvantaged and disparities of wealth be-
tween rich and poor – disparities which are markedly greater in liberal than in coordi-
nated market economies – become so acute as to amount in themselves to a form of stat-
us distinction – the very feature which Whitman argues to have fostered the “degrada-
tion dynamic” in early modern criminal justice systems.77 In this context it is interesting 
to note the further empirical fact that PR-based coordinated market democracies are sig-
nificantly more likely both to elect left-of-center governments and to display lower dis-
parities between the best and worst off.78 In the face of political-economic imperatives 
leading to ever-increasing disparities of wealth and de facto status distinctions in the lib-
eral, Anglo-Saxon economies, the anti-degradation mentality is relatively weak. Whit-
man’s degradation hypothesis, in short, needs to be articulated with a theory of the 
structure of political economy: the power of anti-degradation sentiments is itself a func-
tion of their resonance and consistency with broader dynamics of socio-economic or-
ganization. Features of both political and economic organization which conduce to low-
er disparities of wealth seem likely, in short, to make it easier for governments to pursue 
inclusionary criminal justice policies. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
British social policy on the number of socially excluded young men who become victims of homi-
cide.  
76Richard Sennett, Respect in a World of Inequality (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p. 23. 
77Note that this argument in turn dissolves Whitman’s apparent paradox about the coexistence of 
degrading punishment with (formal) status egalitarianism in the contemporary U.S.A.  
78See Torben Iversen and David Soskice, “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: 
Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,” American Political Science Review 100 
(2006): 165-181. The authors’ suggested explanation for this finding is complex, but hinges on the 
need within PR systems for multiple political parties to form coalitions, and hence to be able to 
commit to governing partners – and hence to the electorate – about policies to be pursued during 
a given term of office. Within such a structure, it is also the case that interests represented within 
smaller parties forming coalitions have a greater chance of finding a political footing, while the 
volatile force represented by the power of the median voter, who “floats” between the two par-
ties characteristic of majoritarian systems, is correspondingly less, being mediated by credible 
commitments made during the bargaining process. In such a system, where coalition partners 
can hold each other, during government, to pre-election bargains, centrist parties holding the bal-
ance of power will tend to have more to gain from aligning themselves with left- than with right- 
wing parties: the middle classes they represent have an interest in maintaining good levels of 
public services, and the minority centrist party will be able to bargain with the left-of-center party 
to prevent it from moving too far left during its term of office.  
  22 3) The welfare state 
 
Another key difference between capitalist democracies in the “late modern” era 
has been their development of policies across the whole range of institutions associated 
with the postwar welfare state.79 Here again, to paint with very broad brush strokes, po-
litical economies at relatively similar levels of development, characterized by broadly 
liberal-democratic political structures, have taken markedly different paths. While 
countries like Britain and the U.S. have adopted neo-liberal policies committed to “roll-
ing back the state” and curtailing public expenditure,80 the Scandinavian, “social-
democratic” countries have maintained their welfare states more or less intact, with 
European, “continental” countries like Germany adopting a pattern closer, in terms of 
generosity of provision and scope of coverage, to their Scandinavian than to their British 
neighbors.  
 
Among variables in political-economic structure, the welfare state is the institu-
tional feature that has received most sustained attention from comparative penologists. 
Cavadino and Dignan, for example, give significant emphasis to the universal coverage 
provided by the social-democratic welfare states of Scandinavia, drawing attention to 
the distinction between them and the more selective, stratified welfare states of corpora-
tist countries. It is, of course, highly plausible that the impact of relatively generous wel-
fare provision on the reduction of both absolute and relative poverty would have a 
knock-on effect on crime. Less obviously, there is also evidence that it is associated with 
levels of penality. David Downes and Kirstine Hansen have recently shown, on the basis 
of a study covering eighteen countries, that countries spending a higher proportion of 
their GDP on welfare have lower imprisonment rates – a relationship which has grown 
stronger over the last fifteen years.81 But the precise causal mechanism is not so clear. Is 
it, once again, a cultural argument: that the generous and inclusionary instincts repre-
sented in welfare-state policies are likely to be reflected in criminal justice policy? Beck-
                                            
79Gǿsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); 
Welfare States in Transition (London: Sage, 1996): the “liberal,” “social-democratic” and “continen-
tal” typology is drawn from Andersen. The main differences between social-democratic and con-
tinental systems under his scheme are the tendency of the former to fund welfare provision from 
general taxation rather than payroll taxes; the size of the public sector; and the low scale of in-
volvement of private bodies in providing public services. 
80For discussion of this development in Britain, and of its implications for criminal justice, see 
Paddy Hillyard and Steve Tombs, “Towards a political economy of harm: states, corporations 
and the production of inequality,” in Paddy Hillyard, Christina Pantazis, Steve Tombs and Dave 
Gordon, eds., Beyond Criminology: Taking Harm Seriously (London: Pluto Press, 2005), pp. 30-54. 
81David Downes and Kirstine Hansen, “Welfare and Punishment in Comparative Perspective,” in 
S. Armstrong and L, McAra, eds. Perspectives on Punishment (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Downes and Hansen note that recent increases in welfare spending in the UK have, however, co-
incided with significant growth in the prison population. They suggest that this may be due to 
the much-remarked failure of a sufficient proportion of these resources to find their way into the 
delivery of education, medical and other caring activities as opposed to their restructuring and 
management. An alternative hypothesis would be that this reflects the increasing “bifurcation” of 
social policy, with sustained welfare provision for those whom there is an interest in reintegrat-
ing (as in “welfare to work”), and the removal of benefits from those who will not, or cannot be, 
incorporated into the economy. 
  23 ett and Western have argued,82 on the basis of a study of U.S. states with findings 
similar to that of Downes and Hansen, that welfare regimes vary according to their 
commitment to including or excluding marginal groups: the more inclusive systems ex-
hibit both higher welfare spending and lower imprisonment rates. But are there other 
factors that predispose countries or regions towards inclusivity or exclusivity in both 
penal and welfare arrangements?  
                                           
 
It would be nice to be able to attribute the persistence of decent welfare provision 
and penal moderation to generous and humane sensibilities. But it seems likely that both 
the distinctive structures of welfare states and penal moderation are articulated with 
broader political and economic dynamics. In other words, there are political-economic 
reasons which explain why it is possible – indeed sensible – for some countries to main-
tain generous and expensive welfare provision even in the face of increasing competi-
tion from countries that are not investing public resources in this way. A range of expla-
nations has focused on precisely such an articulation of the welfare state to the structure 
of the economy, and I canvassed some of them in my discussion of production regimes. 
Within a liberal market economy in a flexible and increasingly services-based economy, 
governments have chosen to maximize incentives to rejoin the labor market, a strategy 
that has had sufficient plausibility with a critical mass of the electorate because of the 
high degree of transferable skills within the work force. Within the labor markets of 
countries with less flexibility, where long-term investment in less transferable skills (as 
in the social-democratic and continental systems), or an extensive public sector provid-
ing employment for women and services for dual-career families (as in the social-
democratic systems of Scandinavia), are still key to comparative advantage, it makes 
sense to give relatively generous support to workers who experience periods of unem-
ployment rather than encouraging them to retrain or to find work in new sectors of the 
economy. Pace Margaret Thatcher (and, in part, Tony Blair), generosity of welfare pro-
vision and relatively secure employment relations appear, under certain combined con-
ditions, to be just as good a basis for economic success and stability as relentless flexibi-
lization and welfare cuts. For, though there has been some recent reduction of welfare 
benefits in several of the European corporatist countries,83 the remaining differences are 
significant and seem unlikely to be eroded in the near future. 
 
4) Institutional capacity to integrate “outsiders” 
 
Another key feature of the late modern world, as analyzed by criminologists like 
Garland and Young, is the increasing mobility of the social world from the late 1960s on. 
This mobility has a number of dimensions: in a wealth-valuing culture and flexible 
economy, with relatively high levels of education, there is more mobility between social 
classes; in a globalizing economy characterized by transnational political structures like 
 
82K. Beckett and B. Western, “Governing social marginality,” in D. Garland, ed., Mass Imprison-
ment: Social Causes and Consequences (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 35-50. 
83N. Gilbert, The Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility (Ox-
ford University Press, 2002). Downes’s and Hansen’s figures for 1998 reveal the scale of the dif-
ference, with the proportion of GDP spent on welfare ranging from 31 percent in Sweden to less 
than half that level – 14.6 percent – in the U.S. Again, the figures arrange themselves on CME/LME 
lines, with the exception of Japan, which has a level of welfare spending similar to that of the U.S.  
  24 the EU, marked also by relatively cheap international travel and mass communications, 
there is more geographical mobility. These developments have added new layers of 
complexity to what might be seen as one of the central challenges for any democratic 
system of criminal justice: that of “reintegrating” offenders into society and economy.  
 
This is far too complex an issue to be susceptible of even a preliminary analysis 
in this paper. But it is interesting to note – and a corrective to what might be seen as the 
temptation to think that the coordinated market economies of Europe and Scandinavia 
are necessarily better placed to sustain democratically acceptable levels of penal moder-
ation than their liberal-market Anglo-Saxon counterparts – that the structure of this 
problem may be significantly different in the two sorts of system. While the laissez-faire 
and individualistic culture typical of liberal market economies may well make it rela-
tively easy to integrate geographical or “cultural” “outsiders” like recent immigrants 
wherever they find access to the labor market, the more intensively group- and skills-
based system of the coordinated market economies may well pose significant challenges 
in terms of integrating newcomers into the representative and decision-making struc-
tures that have helped to sustain a relatively moderate criminal justice policy with rela-
tively high institutional capacity for reintegration. Coordinated market economies are, in 
short, good places to be incorporated insiders, but hard systems to enter from the out-
side. In this respect I remember that, during research on community-based criminal jus-
tice policies in Germany which Lucia Zedner and I conducted over a decade ago, we 
were already struck by the strong association of crime with the image of the “Aus-
lander” – an image which was in marked contrast to the (admittedly no more attractive) 
class, age and race-based stereotypes informing British criminal justice debate of the 
time.84 In a relatively closed and highly coordinated system, it makes sense for the gov-
ernment to support citizens who temporarily fall on hard times – and it is hence relative-
ly easy to garner political support for such policies. But the impact of a large inflow of 
unincorporated “outsiders,” for example through the sort of economic migration which 
has featured particularly strongly in continental Europe and some parts of Scandinavia 
since the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, may cause particular strain, significantly un-
dermining the institutional capacity to sustain inclusionary social policies across the 
board – with worrying implications for criminal justice.  
 
This argument might help to explain the relatively high proportion of foreign 
prisoners in social democratic and, particularly, corporatist countries.85 But might it also 
help to explain the worrying recent trends towards greater penal severity in countries 
like Sweden, Denmark, Finland and – most spectacularly of all – the Netherlands? It 
would be depressing to think that these quintessentially tolerant – though, until the 
events of 1989, relatively homogenous – societies may be being pushed in a less tolerant 
direction by the challenge of diversity. But Beckett’s and Western’s argument about the 
relationship between inclusionary welfare provisions and moderation in punishment 
                                            
84Nicola Lacey and Lucia Zedner, “Discourses of Community in Criminal Justice,” Journal of Law 
and Society (1994): op. cit., note 52; “Community in German Criminal Justice: A Significant Ab-
sence,” Social and Legal Studies 7 (1998). 
85See Figure 1 below; see also Council of Europe, ”SPACE 1 Annual Penal Statistics 2005 (by Mar-
celo F. Aebi and Natalia Stadnic), Table 3 (International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison 
Brief, 2006). 
  25 may perhaps help us towards an explanation, while providing a ray of hope for the fu-
ture. Their further finding of a positive relationship between levels of imprisonment, the 
proportion of black and ethnic minority groups, levels of poverty and Republican repre-
sentation led them to argue that welfare and penal policy tend to be closely tied mainly 
at times “when efforts are made to alter prevailing approaches to social marginality.”86 
Much more research would be needed to establish precisely what is happening in the so-
cial democratic countries to prompt the recent rise in penality, let alone whether it is 
likely to be sustained. But it seems relevant that in at least some of these countries – like 
the Netherlands, where Downes and van Swaaningen have recently reported that no 
less than 57 percent of the prison population was born outside the country87 – fears 
about the sustainability of established welfare and social structures in the face of large-
scale immigration have fed into the popularity – and in some cases the election – of 
right-wing governments committed to policies akin to the U.S. Republican “efforts to al-
ter prevailing approaches to social marginality.”88  
 
5) Embedding of criminal justice policy within a constitutional structure: the relation-
ship between “police power” and “government by law” 
 
In The Police Power, Markus Dubber advances a historical thesis which may be of 
further relevance to our understanding of the differences in the institutional capacity of 
liberal democracies to sustain relatively moderate criminal justice policies under late 
modern conditions. Like Whitman’s, Dubber’s argument plays out over a very large his-
torical and spatial canvas, but has an essentially simple structure. Looking back even as 
far as the city states of classical Greece, Dubber argues, we can discern two markedly 
different forms of public power: political power and police power. Political power is that 
through which a society of equals governs itself. It is, in effect, a form of self-
government; it takes place through law and is constrained by the demands of justice, 
formal equality and so on. Police power, by contrast, derives from the power of the head 
of a family to govern the resources – animate and inanimate – within his household. It is 
hierarchical and essentially patriarchal power, discretionary and vaguely defined in its 
essence, a power of management over persons and things themselves not invested with 
rights or autonomy. Instrumental and preventive in temper, the police power is oriented 
to goals such as peace, welfare, efficient use of resources and security.89 This is not to say 
that police power is unconstrained: the patriarch is under an obligation to govern his 
household so as to maximize its welfare; hence feckless or malicious exercises of police 
power will be regarded as illegitimate.90 But the nature of these constraints of fitness 
and prudence are markedly different from the criteria of legitimacy governing the 
exercise of genuinely political power. 
                                           
 
 
86K. Beckett and B. Western, “Governing social marginality,” op. cit., p 46. 
87“The Road to Dystopia?” op. cit., Figure 6. 
88See Cavadino and Dignan, op. cit., pp. 47-8, 106-7, 121, 137-8, 146, 166, 307, 314; David Downes, 
“Visions of Penal Control in the Netherlands,” and Downes and René van Swaaningen, “The 
Road to Dystopia? Changes in the Penal Climate of the Netherlands,” op. cit. 
89The Police Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), Chapter 5. 
90Ibid., op. cit., note 68, pp. 42 ff. and Chapter 8. 
  26 Dubber traces the distinction between political and police power through the 
centuries and through a wide range of influential legal and philosophical tracts from 
Aristotle through to Locke, Rousseau, Blackstone and Smith.91 In England, the emer-
gence of an increasingly powerful monarch, and the expanding reach of the King’s 
Peace, gradually overlaid the police power of landowners with the overarching police 
power of the monarch. Within this emerging structure, the monarch constituted, as it 
were, the macro-householder in relation to whom all subjects, including the landowning 
micro-householders, were regarded as resources to be managed efficiently (and as bene-
ficiaries of the monarch’s paternalist obligations). The police power of the monarch lay 
alongside the political and legal structures which treat persons as formally equal – nota-
bly jury trials. Looking far back into the history of early modern England, provisions 
such as the Statute of Labourers, anti-vagrancy and gaming laws were, Dubber suggests, 
quintessentially manifestations of the police power rather than of self-government 
through law. Exquisite status distinctions marked the system at every level: even the 
main law of serious crimes – the law of felony – found its origins in outlawry, was 
rooted in the notion of a breach of the feudal nexus, existed primarily to protect the 
Lords (just as Treason existed to protect the monarch) and was trained primarily on 
those of low status – the non-householders.92 Where restitutive or reparative measures 
were ineffective, the primary resort of the criminal process was explicitly degrading, 
typically physical, punishment. Such punishments were designed to enact on the sub-
ject’s body the degradation which, notwithstanding trial by jury, his or her offense im-
plied, without thereby permanently unfitting him for productive labor (hence the preva-
lence of whipping). Criminal justice and punishment were, in this view, primarily a hier-
archical means of managing a population and not an expression of self-governance with-
in a community of equals.  
 
With the gradual emergence of modern sensibilities and a vestigially democratic 
structure of government, this ambiguity about the status of criminal justice, lying on the 
muddy border between political/legal and police power, became more troubling. The 
place of the police power, and its relationship with legal/constitutional/political power, 
became yet harder to rationalize within an overarching political theory. Imported – 
ironically but enthusiastically – to the United States by the Founding Fathers, the police 
power, Dubber argues, flourishes to this day in the U.S.A. Yet it has never been settled 
within a constitutional or other legal framework which could generate the sorts of ac-
countability consistent with the overall attitude to public power in a liberal-democratic 
polity. It would generally be taken as obvious that criminal justice power is legal power: 
the subjects of modern criminal law have in most systems a panoply of procedural 
rights, and criminal justice systems are increasingly subject to the overarching regulation 
of bills of rights enshrined in national constitutions or supra-national legal instruments 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights. But, Dubber argues, if we look at 
the substance of criminal law – what may be criminalized and how – we see, even in a 
country with as robust a constitutional culture as the U.S.A., something approaching a 
vacuum in terms of accepted constraints. While the power to punish may be weakly con-
strained by standards such as the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, the 
                                            
91Ibid., Part I. 
92Ibid., pp. 14-16, 19. 
  27 power to criminalize remains all but unconstrained. This, he suggests, discloses strong 
traces of the police mentality which characterized much of the early, premodern crimi-
nal justice system, particularly that trained on the governance of the lower-status mem-
bers of society.  
 
Despite some discussion of the origins of the concept of police in French thought 
and of the continental development of a “police science” in the eighteenth century,93 
Dubber does not pursue any sustained comparative analysis. But his argument may cer-
tainly be put to comparative use. For the purposes of explaining contemporary differ-
ences in attitudes to the proper constraints on penal power, the key point in his story 
comes with the emergence of modern democratic sentiments and political structures. 
This is a point at which, as we have seen, the tension between law and police becomes 
much harder to manage than within the older, status-based societies that preceded the 
modern era. My suggestion is that there may be another important difference here 
among modern democracies. On the one hand we have societies such as those of conti-
nental Europe, whose modern constitutional settlement made explicit the distinction be-
tween police and law. These settlements aimed to domesticate the police power within a 
new political framework, while explicitly differentiating it from legal power. On the 
other hand, we have societies such as Britain and the U.S.A., which absorbed the police 
power, unacknowledged, within the new legal power.94 In these societies, the police 
power infuses the self-governing, autonomy-respecting aspects of criminal law with a 
managerial mentality in which the ends always justify the means. It is worth examining 
this distinction in some detail.  
 
In both Britain and the U.S.A., probably the most obvious manifestation of the 
police power is the existence of widespread regulatory offenses in areas such as driving, 
health and safety, licensing, low-grade public disorder. These mala prohibita – many of 
them attracting strict liability95 – are often regarded by criminal law scholars as an em-
barrassing exception to the normal principles governing the law of mala in se or “real 
crime.” They exist to promote the social welfare, and since their conviction does not im-
ply the sort of stigma or the severe penalties attached to “real crimes” such as murder or 
                                            
93Ibid., Chapter 4. 
94As Dubber notes, in many countries – including both Germany and the U.S.A. the debate about 
whether the police power is an aspect of legal power or whether it is a separate branch of govern-
ment continued right up to the twentieth century, with marked differences of opinion as to the 
implications of locating the police power within the criminal justice system (The Police Power, 
Chapter 7). In the U.S., for example, Roscoe Pound was inclined to regard the police power’s con-
sequentialist orientation as appropriate to the tasks of rational modern governance. By contrast, 
jurists like Sayre regarded it as having a dangerous capacity to subvert the procedural safeguards 
and autonomy-respecting constraints of a truly legal order. In effect, Dubber suggests, the views 
of Pound have won the day: the police power flourishes at both state and federal levels, albeit ra-
tionalized in different ways (ibid., Chapter 6). At the federal level, it is disguised as an exercise of 
the right to regulate commerce; at the state level, the constitutional appropriateness of police 
power is acknowledged, yet the state courts have been slow to develop the sort of theory of sub-
stantive due process which might effectively constrain its definition and exercise. Dubber himself 
begins to develop such a theory (ibid., Chapter 9). 
95I.e., liability without proof of fault in the sense of responsibility conditions such as intention, 
recklessness, negligence or knowledge. 
  28 theft, the absence of a robust responsibility requirement and suspension of the procedur-
al safeguards which purportedly characterize the criminal justice system are tolerated. 
Examine any treatise on criminal law, however, and you will find little about these nu-
merous regulatory offenses. Nor will a standard treatise give much space to troubling 
“exceptions” to the “normal” principles of criminal procedure such as anti-social behav-
ior orders,96 which deploy a formally civil process to invoke a substantively criminaliz-
ing power. These absences reflect the difficulty of reconciling regulatory mechanisms 
with the predominant conception of criminal law as a quasi-moral normative system 
concerned with wrong-doing and culpability.97 British and American criminal law there-
fore encompasses two markedly different sorts of regulatory systems; but, because this 
is rarely acknowledged, there has been little effort either to rationalize the quasi-moral 
and the morally neutral, instrumental forms of social regulation or – more importantly – 
to develop a proper account of the limits of the state’s regulatory power.  
 
On the continent of Europe, however, this location of regulatory offenses within 
the framework of criminal law “proper” would be regarded as most unsatisfactory. 
Rather than sweeping the old police power within the modern framework of criminal 
justice, the modern governmental settlements of European codification of the early nine-
teenth century were inclined to separate out this form of social regulation within a dis-
crete framework, leaving regulatory offenses as a more visible and autonomous manifes-
tation of state power. As Whitman puts it: “[T]he strength of the bureaucratised Euro-
pean state also helps explain another crucial aspect of mildness in French and German 
punishment: the capacity of French and German law to define some forbidden acts as 
something less awful than ‘crimes’ – as mere contraventions or Ordnungswidrigkeiten. 
When European jurists define these species of forbidden conduct, they are able to make 
use of terms which would trouble Americans. The justification for punishing Ordnungs-
widrigkeiten, according to standard texts, lies in the pure sovereign prerogative of the 
state….” This, Whitman argues, has decisive implications for the severity of punish-
ment: “[I]t is important to recognize what Europeans gain by pursuing this form of 
analysis. Because they are able to defer to state power, they are able to treat some of-
fenses as merely forbidden, rather than as evil: – as mala prohibita rather than mala in se. 
The contrast with the United States is strong: our liberal, anti-statist tradition leads us to 
conclude that nothing may be forbidden by the state unless it is evil…”98 And it is this 
association of crime with evil which has come to feed so intractably into other, political-
economic dynamics favoring penal severity.  
 
                                            
96Crime and Disorder Act 1998; www.crimereduction.gov.uk/asbos5.htm; see Tim Newburn, 
“Young People, Crime and Youth Justice,” in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner, ed., 
The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, third edition (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 531-578 at 
pp. 563-4; and Ken Pease, “Crime Reduction,” in Maguire et al., pp. 947-979, at pp. 969-70. 
97For further analysis and discussion, see Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstruct-
ing Criminal Law, third edition (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Nicola Lacey, “In Search 
of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Criminal Law Theory,” Modern Law Review 
64 (2001): 350-371. And for a recent, explicit, example of the marginalization of regulatory of-
fenses, see Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 16. 
98Harsh Justice, op. cit., note 29 p. 201 (both quotations). 
  29 Doubtless we should not exaggerate the significance of this difference between 
the European and the British and American systems. After all, explicitly administrative 
or regulatory power may be abused just as readily as criminal justice power. But there is 
nonetheless something important about the way in which the continental systems de-
clined to sweep the old police power under the carpet of the modern criminal justice sys-
tem: a recognition of the need for regulation in the name of social welfare, but equally a 
recognition that this is a different project from criminal justice and state punishment, 
calling for separate scrutiny and a different kind of justification. My suggestion is that 
this recognition of the distinctiveness of criminal justice and penal power may also be 
associated with a more robust attitude to the need for the state to justify its penal power, 
and for that penal power to be held to legal account, in countries like postwar Germany 
and the Netherlands as compared with Britain and the United States.99 When combined 
with the political economy analysis sketched earlier section, this comparative legal 
framework may help us to understand the persisting differences between the German, 
Swedish, Dutch and the British or U.S. systems – as well as illuminating the dynamics 
which may be putting those longstanding differences under pressure.100  
 
Conclusion 
 
It would take a yet longer analysis and a much larger body of evidence, embrac-
ing a wider range of institutional variables, to accomplish anything like a full analysis of 
the questions raised in this paper. I trust, however, that I have succeeded in establishing 
an essentially simple point: It is of little use to have a clear program of institutional cri-
minal justice reform, embedded within a coherent theory of liberal democracy, if pre-
vailing features of political and economic structure or culture make it impossible to gar-
ner the electoral and political support or to build the institutional capacity necessary to 
enact, implement and sustain that program. Recent research on, and informed debate 
about, criminal justice gives us reason to believe that there are significant political con-
                                            
99Cf. Lazarus’s account of legal protections for prisoners in Germany: Contrasting Prisoners’ Rights, 
op. cit., note 36.  
100In this context it is interesting to note the outcome of last year’s (September 2005) German elec-
tions, in which the Christian Democrats were widely predicted to gain a substantial victory. In 
the event, their neo-liberal agenda of economic reform – which, had it been thoroughly pursued, 
would have attempted to move Germany away from the coordinated towards the liberal market 
economy structure – appears to have deprived them of decisive electoral success, with the Ger-
man electorate (and indeed some parts of the CDU) resisting transition to flexible labor markets 
and the dismantling of social protections characteristic of the postwar political settlement. (Some 
of the same dynamics appear to have influenced the French electorate’s negative assessment of 
the European Constitution.) If my analysis in this paper is correct, this electoral outcome has been 
a positive thing from the point of view of the survival of a relatively tolerant German criminal 
justice policy – at least in relation to those successfully incorporated into the economy. How 
much success a Christian Democratic majority government would have had in dismantling the 
institutional features that sustain Germany’s coordinated market economy is debatable. What 
seems clear, however, is that it is easier to dismantle such institutions than to construct them. To 
this extent, I would suggest that “globalization” – primarily in the sense of economic exchange 
and interdependence – is likely to favor liberal over coordinated market economic structures. I 
therefore – regretfully – share Robert Reiner’s pessimistic prognosis for the future of social-
democratic criminal justice policy (“Beyond Risk,” op. cit., note 24).  
  30 straints on the development and implementation of the sort of criminal justice systems 
which would be indicated by a commitment to liberal-democratic values. Further, as I 
have attempted to show, a comparative analysis suggests that there are key national dif-
ferences in the capacity of broadly liberal democratic systems to deliver the sorts of cri-
minal justice policies to which we would expect them to be committed; systems that re-
spect human rights and the dignity of persons, observe the rule of law, and deliver an ef-
fective response to crime without demonizing and excluding certain sectors of the popu-
lation.  
 
Some sorts of liberal-democratic system may be more capable, in short, of deliv-
ering what normative theorists think of as liberal criminal justice policies than others. 
This may sound like a recipe for dystopia or – at best – for a “second best” approach to 
criminal justice policymaking. But even if our analysis suggests that the room for ma-
neuver may be slight, it seems important to try to grasp – at an institutional level – why 
it should be that some kinds of liberal democracy have turned out to be so much better 
at sustaining moderate, relatively tolerant and humane criminal justice systems than 
have others. Neither the UK nor the U.S. is going to adopt a PR system, or restore a gen-
erous welfare system, any more than they are about to empty their prisons and redis-
cover penal welfarism. Countries like Germany, whose economies and societies flourish 
on the basis of a highly coordinated system of group integration – the other face of 
which is an intractable exclusion of outsiders and long-term unincorporated groups – 
are not going to become flexible economies overnight. Along these, and many other in-
stitutional variables that have not been mentioned in this paper, their available criminal 
justice strategies will be accordingly enabled and constrained. Policy improvements are 
possible, and there is some scope for international learning and policy transfer; but the 
appropriateness of reforms is always contingent on the specific dynamics of the local en-
vironment.  
 
Policy transfer has not, in any case, been the object of my comparative argument. 
Rather, I want to suggest that an adequate theoretical analysis of the potential for im-
provement of criminal justice systems in terms of their compliance with democratic ide-
als must be informed by a grasp of their institutional conditions of existence; and that 
these conditions of existence include not merely the shape of criminal justice policies 
and practices but also the broad political and economic structures of a given society. 
Structure is not determination: so even though I cannot, unfortunately, share Radzino-
wicz’s view that “[P]enal history amply demonstrates that unjust levels of punishment 
in democratic societies break down sooner or later,” let me end on a more optimistic 
note.101 The recent reduction of the prison population in this country shows that com-
mitted politicians in liberal market economies can on occasion buck the trend to severity, 
Even British Conservative Home Secretaries – Winston Churchill notable among them –
sometimes manage to effect a reduction in the prison population. Recent data on emerg-
ing political anxieties about the costs of criminal justice in some U.S. states may give us 
hope that sufficiently determined politicians there too may before long be in a position 
                                            
101Sir Leon Radzinowicz, Adventures in Criminology (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 435, cited in 
Tim Newburn, “’Tough on Crime’: Penal Policy in England and Wales,” op. cit., p.41. 
  31 to work effectively towards at least a modest reversal of the trend to harshness.102 To re-
alize criminal justice may not be “feasible”:103 but the realization of less criminal injus-
tice, and of a criminal justice system matching more closely liberal-democratic aspira-
tions, is a worthy goal. It is, however, one towards which we can only make progress on 
the basis of a combined sense of our normative objectives and of the varying institu-
tional environments in which we must pursue them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
102See Sara Steen and Rachel Bandy, “When the policy becomes the problem,” Punishment and 
Society 9 (2007): 5-26. 
103See Philip Pettit, “Is Criminal Justice Feasible?” op. cit., note 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
  32 Figure 1: Political Economy, Imprisonment and Homicide 
 
  Imprison-
ment Rate 
2002-03 
Imprison-
ment Rate 
2006 
Homi-
cide 
Rate 
% Foreign 
Prisoners 
Neo-Liberal Countries 
(liberal market economies) 
      
U.S.A. 701  737  5.56  6.4 
South Africa  402  336  55.86  3.3 
New Zealand  155  186  2.5  9.3 
England and Wales  141  148  1.6  13.6 
Australia 115  125  1.87  19.5 
Conservative corporatist 
countries (coordinated 
market economies) 
      
Italy 100  104  1.5  33.2 
Germany 98  94  1.15  28.2 
Netherlands 100  128  1.51  31.7 
France 93  85  1.71  21.4 
Social democracies 
(coordinated market 
economies) 
      
Sweden 73  82  1.1  26.2 
Finland 70  75  2.86  8.0 
Denmark 58  77  1.02  18.2 
Norway 58  66  .95  17.2 
Oriental corporatist 
(coordinated market 
economy) 
      
Japan 53  62  1.05  7.9 
 
Sources: Adapted from Cavadino and Dignan (2005), Barclay and Tavares (2003), International 
Centre for Prison Studies (2007), Hall and Soskice (2001). 
 
 
Figure 2: Recent Trends in Canadian Imprisonment 
 
  Prison Population  Imprisonment Rate 
2006 34  096  107 
2000-01 35  235  123 
1997-98 37  401  126 
1994-95 38  516  131 
1991-92 35  235  123 
 
Source: International Centre for Prison Studies (2007). 
 
 
 
  33 Figure 3: Imprisonment Rate Trends in the U.S., UK, Germany, Sweden and  
The Netherlands 
 
 1986  1997-98  2006 
U.S. 313 645  737 
UK 93  125  148 
Germany 88  90  94 
Sweden 56  59 82 
Netherlands 34  87  128 
 
Source: Adapted from Cavadino and Dignan (2006), p. 45; International Centre for Prison Studies 
(2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Diagram summarizing main institutional linkages  
in different varieties of political system 
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(with thanks to David Soskice) 
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Figure 5: A Sketch of the Causal Relationships Between Institutional Variables 
 
Source: Figures 5 6, 7 and 8, are taken from Torben Iversen and David Soskice, “Distribution and 
Redistribution: The Shadow of the Nineteenth Century,” typescript on file with the authors. I am 
grateful for their permission to reproduce these diagrams. 
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Figure 6: Inequality and Redistribution (ca. 1970-1995) 
 
Notes: Poverty reduction is the percentage reduction of the poverty rate (the percentage with in-
come below 50 percent of the median) from before to after taxes and transfers. The d9/d5 ratio is 
the earnings of a worker in the top decile of the earnings distribution relative to the earnings of a 
worker with a median income. 
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study and OECD. 
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Figure 7. Vocational Training and Redistribution 
 
Notes: Poverty reduction is defined the same way as in Figure 1. Vocational training intensity is 
the share of an age cohort in either secondary or post-secondary (ISCED5) vocational training. 
Source: UNESCO (1999). 
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Figure 8. The percentage of adults with poor literacy scores (bottom scale), and the 
percentage of adults with low education and high scores (top scale). 13 OECD 
countries, 1994-98. 
Notes: The top bars (using top scale) show the percentage of adults who have not completed an 
upper secondary education but have high scores on document literacy. The bottom bars (using 
bottom scale) show the percentage of adults taking the test who get the lowest score, averaged 
across three test categories.  
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